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INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING 
CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE 
HEART OF THE MATTER 
Emily Kelly* 
Abstract: The grave inadequacy of current international attempts to cur-
tail organ trafficking signals the need for a new approach in the form of a 
fundamental paradigm shift. Instead of continuing to focus efforts solely 
on criminalization, countries must devise a broad scheme aimed at de-
creasing organ shortages. These shortages fuel the illegal organ market, 
as people desperate for life-saving transplants travel internationally to 
purchase organs. Until the demand for this underground market sub-
sides, traffickers will continue to exploit inconsistent legal loopholes in 
different countries by hopping across borders. To effectively address this 
problem, the international community must craft a new binding instru-
ment that uniformly criminalizes organ trafficking while simultaneously 
encouraging domestic legislation to address the organ shortage. 
Introduction 
 Universal organ shortages have catalyzed a thriving underground 
market for organs, which has generated human rights abuses, public 
health disasters, and transnational crime.1 While most commentators 
believe that curtailing organ trafficking requires a coordinated global 
effort, few policymakers agree on what that effort should entail.2 Coun-
 
 
* Emily Kelly is the Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 See United Nations & Council of Eur., Trafficking in Organs, Tissues and Cells 
and Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purpose of the Removal of Organs 5 (2009), 
available at http://tdh-childprotection.org/documents/trafficking-in-organs-tissues-and-cells-
and-trafficking-in-human-beings-for-the-purpose-of-the-removal-of-organs; Dean L’hospital, 
The Medium-of-Exchange Paradigm: A Fresh Look at Compensated Live-Organ Donation, 2 Hum. Rts. 
& Globalization L. Rev. 1, 1 (2009); Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, The Sum of a Human’s 
Parts: Global Organ Trafficking in the Twenty-First Century, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2010); 
Erica D. Roberts, When the Storehouse Is Empty, Unconscionable Contracts Abound: Why Transplant 
Tourism Should Not Be Ignored, 52 How. L.J. 747, 749, 777 (2009). 
2 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 96 (recommending creation 
of a binding international treaty to prevent trafficking in organs, tissues, and cells); 
L’hospital, supra note 1, at 20; Elizabeth Pugliese, Organ Trafficking and the TVPA: Why One 
Word Makes a Difference in International Enforcement Efforts, 24 J. Contemp. Health L. & 
Pol’y 181, 197 (2007); Roberts, supra note 1, at 789 (recommending stricter U.S. laws 
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tries have adopted many policies to address the illicit sale of human 
body parts, but competing cultural values and disparate enforcement 
have yielded inconsistent results.3 Moreover, globalized markets, com-
munication, and transportation enable traffickers to move their opera-
tions fluidly, taking advantage of legal loopholes.4 As a result, enforce-
ment in one country merely prompts traffickers to seek other countries 
with more favorable legal environments.5 
 The challenge inherent in constructing a coordinated global solu-
tion to organ trafficking is rooted in confusion over the scope of the 
problem itself.6 News reports on the subject frequently focus on the 
kidnapping that results in stolen organs,7 drawing more attention to 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal rather than the 
larger problem of trafficking in organs, tissues, and cells (OTC).8 Hu-
man trafficking for the purpose of organ removal involves the coercive 
transport of an individual and subsequent organ removal.9 By contrast, 
in OTC trafficking organs are obtained by coercion and then sold for 
transplant.10 The international community has established binding le-
gal standards for human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal,11 
but has paid significantly less attention to the broader problem of OTC 
trafficking.12 Thus, while international organizations condemn OTC 
trafficking, they have failed to construct an international legal instru-
ment to address the problem.13 
 This Note explores the possibility of a more effective global anti-
OTC-trafficking regime by evaluating as a model the current frame-
work that combats human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. 
                                                                                                                      
against transplant tourism and sanctions against states that allow and encourage the prac-
tice); Erica Teagarden, Human Trafficking: Legal Issues in Presumed Consent Laws, 30 N.C. J. 
Int’l & Com. Reg. 685, 688 (2005). 
3 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 30; Panjabi, supra note 1, at 
5; Roberts, supra note 1, at 749–50; Teagarden, supra note 2, at 686–87. 
4 See F. Ambagtsheer & W. Weimar, A Criminological Perspective: Why Prohibition of Organ 
Trade Is Not Effective and How the Declaration of Istanbul Can Move Forward, 12 Am. J. Trans-
plantation 571, 572 (2011); Panjabi, supra note 1, at 4; Roberts, supra note 1, at 775. 
5 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 57. 
6 See id. at 11. 
7 See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, Seven Charged in International Organ-Trafficking Ring Based in Kos-
ovo, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2010, at A4. 
8 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 11. 
9 See Leslie P. Francis & John G. Francis, Stateless Crimes, Legitimacy, and International 
Criminal Law: The Case of Organ Trafficking, 4 Crim. L. & Phil. 283, 285–86 (2010). 
10 See id. 
11 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 97. 
12 See id. at 96. 
13 See id. 
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Part I outlines the growth of the global underground market for or-
gans, highlighting the difference between OTC trafficking and human 
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. Part II discusses the vari-
ous international and domestic legal regimes that have attempted to 
quell both types of trafficking. It contrasts the apparent lack of interna-
tional law concerning OTC trafficking with the more comprehensive 
system that prohibits human trafficking for the purpose of organ re-
moval. Part III analyzes whether a binding multilateral treaty, as pro-
posed by the Council of Europe and the United Nations (UN), would 
reduce the prevalence of OTC trafficking. After evaluating existing 
treaties’ effectiveness in reducing human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal, Part III concludes that similar methods would fail to 
address OTC trafficking effectively. Rather, a multilateral treaty should 
aim to remove the cause of the underground market by reducing the 
organ shortage itself. 
I. Background 
A. Snapshot of International Organ Trafficking 
 Trafficking in organs is a growing, lucrative enterprise much like 
the illicit markets for weapons, humans, and drugs.14 The media has 
sensationalized myths concerning organ trafficking since the 1980s,15 
reporting both exaggerated kidnapping accounts and reliable reports of 
underground organ markets.16 Although the precise scope of the prob-
lem remains shrouded in uncertainty, the international community rec-
ognizes organ trafficking as a human rights and public health con-
cern.17 The underground organ trade constitutes ten percent of 
worldwide organ transplants, producing between $600 million and $1.2 
billion in illicit revenue each year.18 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Ambagtsheer & Weimar, supra note 4, at 572. 
15 See U.N. Secretary-General, Preventing, Combating and Punishing Trafficking in Human 
Organs: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2006/10 (Feb. 21, 2006) 
[hereinafter UN Organ Trafficking Report]. 
16 See id. 
17 See id.; Panjabi, supra note 1, at 6; Roberts, supra note 1, at 777. 
18 Ambagtsheer & Weimar, supra note 4, at 572; Dominique Martin, The Long Road from 
the Kidney Bazaar: A Commentary on Pakistan’s Progress Towards Self-Sufficiency in Organ Trans-
plantation, PORTAL J. Multidisciplinary Int’l Stud. ( July 2011), http://epress.lib.uts. 
edu.au/journals/index.php/portal/article/view/1833/2515. 
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 Although organ trafficking centers routinely shift locations, several 
countries have gained notoriety as hotbeds.19 Pakistan, one of the larg-
est “kidney bazaars” in the world, has a thriving underground market 
supplied by impoverished citizens.20 A legal vacuum led to the growth 
of kidney transplants in the late 1980s:21 because there were no na-
tional laws or systems to address organ donation, commercial kidney 
transactions quickly became prevalent.22 Today, brokers work with hos-
pitals to locate impoverished donors, who provide approximately 2000 
kidneys each year.23 
                                                                                                                     
 Egypt is also a center for organ trafficking, with more than eighty 
percent of kidney transplants involving commercial donors.24 As in 
Pakistan, the absence of laws and transplant systems made OTC traf-
ficking the leading method for organ procurement in Egypt.25 Unlike 
Pakistan, however, where donors are predominately Pakistani citizens, 
Egypt’s organ vendor pool is comprised of both impoverished Egyptian 
citizens and sub-Saharan African refugees.26 
 Increasingly, organ trafficking rings involve actors who operate 
simultaneously in multiple countries to recruit donors and recipients.27 
India, China, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Philippines all con-
stitute such organ supply countries.28 Patients from the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and other wealthy countries travel to 
organ supply countries to purchase organs in the underground mar-
ket.29 Such transactions represent OTC trafficking because donors do 
not typically travel from their home country.30 For example, in 2008, 
Indian authorities disbanded a ring of doctors, nurses, paramedics, and 
hospitals that had performed 500 illegal transplants on foreigners using 
predominantly impoverished Indian donors.31 
 
19 See Coal. for Organ Failure Solutions, Sudanese Victims of Organ Traffick-
ing in Egypt 6 (2011) [hereinafter COFS Report]; Panjabi, supra note 1, at 56. 
20 See Farhat Moazam et al., Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic 
Study, Hastings Cent. Rep., May–June 2009, at 29, 30. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. 
24 See COFS Report, supra note 19, at 6. 
25 See id. 
26 Compare id. at 6–7, with Moazam et al., supra note 20, at 30. 
27 See Ambagtsheer & Weimar, supra note 4, at 572; Francis & Francis, supra note 9, at 
286. 
28 See Martin, supra note 18. 
29 See Ambagtsheer & Weimar, supra note 4, at 257. 
30 See id.; Francis & Francis, supra note 9, at 285–86. 
31 See Dominick Tao, Worldwide Market Fuels Illegal Traffic in Organs, N.Y. Times, July 30, 
2009, at A26. 
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 Instances of human trafficking for organ removal are also preva-
lent.32 This type of trafficking involves the transport of humans 
through threat, force, or other coercion, including payment.33 For ex-
ample, in November 2008, Yilman Altun, a Turkish national, was trans-
ported to a clinic in Kosovo, where his kidney was removed and trans-
planted into an elderly Israeli who paid the clinic more than 
$100,000.34 When Altun subsequently collapsed at the airport, authori-
ties traced his operation to a network of organ traffickers.35 The Kos-
ovar clinic offered up to $20,000 for organs from impoverished Turk-
ish, Russian, Moldovan, and Kazakh nationals; most victims never 
received compensation.36 Trafficking rings are not limited to the de-
veloping world; U.S. federal authorities uncovered a trafficking ring 
when they arrested Levy-Izhak Rosenbaum for arranging the sale of a 
kidney for $160,000.37 The subsequent investigation revealed 
Rosenbaum’s practice of importing foreign donors and selling their 
organs to U.S. citizens.38 
patients 
om
                                                                                                                     
B. The Birth of Organ Trafficking 
 Although organ shortages catalyzed the underground market39 for 
organs, globalization, technological advancement, and economic ine-
quality have made it thrive.40 As a result, approximately 5000 ill 
fr  developed countries buy illicit organs every year.41 
 Doctors performed the first successful organ transplant in 1954, 
and technological advancements have since increased success rates.42 
 
32 See, e.g., Bilefsky, supra note 7; Tao, supra note 31. 
33 United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 13. 
34 See Bilefsky, supra note 7. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See Tao, supra note 31. 
38 See id. 
39 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 767 (distinguishing underground markets that provide 
illegal goods from black markets that provide legal goods while circumventing governmen-
tally mandated taxes). 
40 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 9; Panjabi, supra note 1, at 8–9; Roberts, supra note 1, 
at 750. 
41 See Michael Smith, A Shadowy, Sometimes Deadly Trade in Organs, Wash. Post, May 29, 
2011, at G3. 
42 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 17–19; Sean Arthurs, 
Comment, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model Congress Should Adopt to Ad-
dress the Abject Failure of Our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1101, 1111 
(2005) (noting new organ transplant therapies that treat more diseases and conditions); 
Panjabi, supra note 1, at 11 (noting prevalent use of drugs like cyclosporine to help pa-
tients accept organs as a factor in the growth of transplant procedures). 
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Unfortunately, long wait lists preclude many patients from these life-
saving procedures.43 In the United States, 110,693 patients make up the 
waiting list for organs, yet fewer than 15,000 donors become available 
each year.44 Similar shortages exist across the globe, sparking ethical 
debates over compensation for live donors and laws that presume donor 
consent upon death.45 Additionally, the shortage drives desperate pa-
tients underground when established wait lists fail to meet their needs.46 
 Patients’ demand for organs is supplied by a vulnerable source: 
impoverished individuals in developing countries facing their own 
unique struggles for survival.47 Living donors in such countries can 
provide kidneys, liver lobes, lungs, and corneas in exchange for com-
pensation.48 Often, the need to pay a coercive lender or buy food for 
survival catalyzes the decision to sell an organ through the under-
ground market.49 For example, Pakistani laborers’ paltry salaries force 
them to accrue debt from their employers.50 The loans are virtually 
impossible to pay off, leading laborers to essentially remain “bonded” 
to their employers.51 Consequently, many have turned to the under-
ou
offers its clients comprehensive services including “travel, hotel accom-
                                                                                                                     
gr nd market in order to escape debt.52 
 Recognizing opportunity in both patients’ and donors’ despera-
tion, organ traffickers have created elaborate and profitable worldwide 
brokerage systems.53 The most common form of organ trafficking, 
“transplant tourism,” occurs when patients travel to foreign countries for 
transplant. 54 Websites advertise comprehensive “transplant packages” 
prepared by brokers who retain considerable fees for their matching 
services.55 For example, a U.S.-based company with ties to Colombia 
 
43 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 19–20. 
44 See Smith, supra note 41. 
45 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 5; Roberts, supra note 1, at 788. 
46 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 787. 
47 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 10; Panjabi, supra note 1, at 3. 
48 See Francis & Francis, supra note 9, at 285. 
49 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 10; Panjabi, supra note 1, at 3; see also Moazam et al., 
supra note 20, at 30–31 (explaining that workers in Pakistan who accumulate debts that are 
impossible to repay often decide to sell a kidney). 
50 See Moazam et al., supra note 20, at 31. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 Panjabi, supra note 1, at 9; Roberts, supra note 1, at 788. 
54 See Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture 
Based on Integration of Available Information, Bull. World Health Org., Dec. 2007, at 955, 
956. 
55 See id. 
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modation, meals, testing/evaluation, surgical procedures, [and] post-
surgical care.”56 
C. Effects of Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism 
 Transplant tourism and organ trafficking have pervasive negative 
effects.57 Organ trafficking exploits poor individuals who are desperate 
to make money for survival.58 Because profit-motivated facilitators ne-
gotiate most transactions, donor compensation is often extremely low.59 
For example, kidney donors frequently receive less than one-third of 
the price that recipients pay for the organ, despite initial promises of 
higher payment.60 Furthermore, donors rarely receive adequate health 
care after the transplant, generating negative health outcomes that im-
pede their ability to work and worsening their long-run financial and 
physical condition.61 As a result, donors rarely succeed in paying off the 
very debts that often lead them to sell an organ in the first place.62 
 In addition, studies have exposed the negative sociological and 
psychological effects of organ sales.63 Kidney vendors frequently ex-
press regret and disgrace associated with the decision to sell a body 
part.64 Communities with high rates of organ sales also shame donors, 
leading many to conceal their decision out of embarrassment.65 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Roger Lee Mendoza, Columbia’s Organ Trade: Evidence from Bogotá and Medellín, 18 
J. Pub. Health 375, 381 (2010). 
57 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 10; Roberts, supra note 1, at 780. 
58 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 780. 
59 See id. at 780–81. 
60 See id. at 781. 
61 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 10; Roberts, supra note 1, at 782–83; see also Madhav 
Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India, 288 J. Am. Med. 
Ass’n 1589, 1591 (2002) (finding eighty-six percent of organ donors in India experienced 
a decline in health after surgery); Imran Sajjad et al., Commercialization of Kidney Trans-
plants: A Systematic Review of Outcomes in Recipients and Donors, 28 Am. J. Nephrology 744, 
750 (2008) (finding ninety-eight percent of Pakistani organ donors reported a decline in 
their general health). 
62 See L’hospital, supra note 1, at 10. 
63 See, e.g., Moazam et al., supra note 20, at 30. 
64 See id. at 35 (describing interviews with kidney vendors who expressed remorse for 
violating religious norms and shame from deceiving their families). 
65 See COFS Report, supra note 19, at 22 (describing a Sudanese victim in Egypt who 
regretted selling his kidney because his fiancée’s family cancelled the wedding after learn-
ing of his organ sale); Moazam et al., supra note 20, at 35 (finding vendors expressed “pro-
found shame at having sold a kidney” and subsequently hid the sale from their family); 
Sajjad et al., supra note 61, at 752–53 (noting a study where ninety-four percent of donors 
were unwilling to identify themselves as donors, even to close relatives). 
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 With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in 
developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant 
tourism.66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not moni-
tor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infec-
tious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV.67 Tragically, transplant tour-
ists also have “a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection 
in the first year after transplantation.”68 
 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies.69 
Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal 
organ donation frameworks.70 For example, Thai patients have diffi-
culty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with 
the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists.71 In 2007, China 
banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners—rather than the 
1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list—received an overwhelming 
amount of organ transplants.72 
 shortages.77 
                                                                                                                     
 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surround-
ing organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruis-
tic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be ex-
ploited.73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and 
exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking.74 Additionally, 
transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.75 Because such bacteria are frequently 
found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique 
strains across borders upon returning to their home countries.76 As a 
result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention 
to the root of the problem: organ
 
66 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 777–78. 
67 See id. at 777; Smith, supra note 41. 
68 Jagbir Gill et al., Transplant Tourism in the United States: A Single-Center Experience, 3 
Clinical J. Am. Soc’y Nephrology 1820, 1822 (2008). 
69 See Tamara L. Hill, The Spread of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria Through Medical Tourism 
and Transmission Prevention Under the International Health Regulations, 12 Chi. J. Int’l L. 273, 
276 (2011); Roberts, supra note 1, at 778. 
70 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 778. 
71 Jon Hamilton, Medical Tourism Creates Thai Doctor Shortage, NPR (Nov. 29, 2007, 12:06 
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16735157. 
72 Mark McDonald, Beijing Investigates Transplants for Tourists, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2009, 
at A13. 
73 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 778. 
74 See id. 
75 See Hill, supra note 69, at 276–77. 
76 See id. 
77 See, e.g., Panjabi, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
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II. Discussion 
A. Domestic Solutions 
 Countries have implemented legislative regimes to address both 
OTC trafficking and human trafficking for organ removal.78 While most 
regimes prohibit organ trafficking, countries differ in their approaches 
to enforcement, which fall into two fundamental categories.79 Some aim 
to eliminate the cause of organ trafficking by reducing the organ short-
age; others seek to eliminate the effects by targeting associated criminal 
activities.80 
1. Attempts to Reduce the Organ Shortage 
 Domestic solutions to reduce organ shortages include procure-
ment systems based on various methods of consent and incentivizing 
donation.81 
a. Altruism and Express Consent 
 The advent of consistently viable organ transplant surgeries in the 
late 1960s prompted countries to regulate organ procurement and do-
nation.82 Many of these regulatory systems, however, failed to anticipate 
the growing demand for organs.83 The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act (UAGA)84 prohibited cadaveric organ donation absent decedents’ 
                                                                                                                      
 
78 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 31–32; Teagarden, supra 
note 2, at 688. 
79 See Cody Corley, Money as a Motivator: The Cure to Our Nation’s Organ Shortage, 11 
Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 93, 95–96 (2011) (describing U.S. legislation aimed at reduc-
ing the organ shortage through altruistic donation); Lisa M. Derco, America’s Organ Dona-
tion Crisis: How Current Legislation Must Be Shaped by Successes Abroad, 27 J. Contemp. 
Health L. & Pol’y 154, 162 (2010) (describing organ procurement systems in Spain, 
Belgium, and Norway designed to reduce the organ shortage); Shaun D. Pattison, Organ 
Trading, Tourism, and Trafficking Within Europe, 27 Med. & L. 191, 193 (2008) (noting legis-
lation in twenty-four states outlawing organ sales aimed at eliminating the effects of organ 
trafficking); Teagarden, supra note 2, at 694–95 (describing a model law aimed at eliminat-
ing criminal effects of organ trafficking by prohibiting organ trading). 
80 See United Nations & Council of Eur., supra note 1, at 31; Corley, supra note 79, at 
95; Derco, supra note 79, at 162; Teagarden, supra note 2, at 695. 
81 See Corley, supra note 79, at 112–13; Derco, supra note 79, at 159, 162. 
82 See Teagarden, supra note 2, at 694. 
83 See Panjabi, supra note 1, at 13; Teagarden, supra note 2, at 694–95. 
84 See generally Anatomical Gift Act (2006), Nat’l Conf. Commissioners on Uniform St. 
Laws, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20(2006) (last 
visited May 17, 2013) (detailing the history and enactment status of the UAGA). As of May 
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written authorization or their families’ explicit consent, thereby imped-
ing organ supplies.85 Although the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has revised the UAGA twice to allow for 
more flexible organ retrieval rules, the transplant waitlist continues to 
grow.86 
 As a result, many commentators argue that U.S. laws remain too 
constraining and altruistic, and will worsen the organ shortage in the 
long term.87 The system for organ procurement in the United States 
stems from the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), which 
created the National Organ Procurement and Transplantation System 
(OPTN) and the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS).88 Under 
the UAGA and the NOTA, organs cannot be sold for consideration.89 
As a result, the OPTN relies solely on altruistic donations from de-
ceased donors who have indicated their intention to donate on identi-
fication cards or orally in the presence of two adults.90 
 Economists argue that such reliance on altruism fails to incentivize 
donation, inherently undermining the transplant regime.91 Logistical 
obstacles also prevent an effective altruistic procurement system: de-
spite contrary language in the UAGA amendments, most organ-
procurement organizations honor family decisions over a decedent’s 
desire to donate.92 Furthermore, individuals often neglect to document 
their intentions.93 Although the majority of Americans support organ 
                                                                                                                      
 
2013, forty-five U.S. states had enacted a version of the UAGA, and one other had intro-
duced a bill proposing enactment. See id. 
85 See Corley, supra note 79, at 95; Teagarden, supra note 2, at 694–95. 
86 See Peter Aziz, Establishing a Free Market in Human Organs: Economic Reasoning and the 
Perfectly Competitive Model, 31 U. La Verne L. Rev. 67, 69, 71–72 (2009) (noting an increase 
from 55,501 candidates on the U.S. national waiting list in 1997 to 100,363 candidates in 
2008). 
87 See, e.g., Sarah Elizabeth Statz, Finding the Winning Combination: How Blending Organ 
Procurement Systems Used Internationally Can Reduce the Organ Shortage, 39 Vand. J. Trans-
nat’l L. 1677, 1688 (2006). 
88 Teagarden, supra note 2, at 693–96. 
89 Aziz, supra note 86, at 75. 
90 See id. 
91 See Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of 
Organ Transplantation, 37 J. Legal Stud. 459, 461 (2008) (using economic models of self-
interest to explain altruistic behavior); Statz, supra note 87, at 1688 (noting the economic 
theory that rational actors react to incentives). 
92 See Hayley Cotter, Increasing Consent for Organ Donation: Mandated Choice, Individual 
Autonomy, and Informed Consent, 21 Health Matrix 599, 602 (2011); Statz, supra note 87, 
at 1688–89. 
93 See Cotter, supra note 92, at 603; see also Donate Life Am., National Donor Designa-
tion Report Card 3 (2011), available at http://donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
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donation, many fail to take the formal and necessary actions to become 
organ donors.94 
b. Presumed Consent and Mandated Choice 
 Some countries have developed organ procurement legislation as 
a vehicle to reduce the organ shortage by shifting the presumption in 
favor of donation.95 They have relied on one of two systemic models: 
presumed consent or mandated choice.96 In a presumed-consent sys-
tem, individuals are presumed to be organ donors unless they affirma-
tively opt out of the program by registering with a government data-
base.97 Spain, France, Austria, Italy, Norway, and a number of other 
European countries employ a variety of presumed-consent models.98 
Although not widely used, mandated choice addresses several flaws in 
the presumed-consent model by requiring all citizens to affirmatively 
indicate donation preferences in conjunction with a required activity, 
such as filing taxes or renewing drivers’ licenses.99 Because of its wider 
application, examples and evaluations of presumed consent are more 
prevalent than those of mandated choice.100 
 Countries employ variations on the presumed-consent model: 
“Pure” presumed consent requires an individual to opt out during his 
or her lifetime in order to avoid donation upon death.101 Family wishes 
are neither elicited nor considered.102 “Soft” systems retain the core 
principles of pure presumed consent, but adopt a more flexible ap-
proach.103 For example, if patients tell family members they oppose 
organ donation but fail to formally register their objection before 
                                                                                                                      
04/DLA-Report-BKLT-30733-2.pdf (noting that designation as an organ donor at the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles is the most common procedure in most states). 
94 See Cotter, supra note 92, at 603; Teagarden, supra note 2, at 699 (citing a 1993 Gal-
lup poll wherein only thirty percent of respondents had signed organ donor cards al-
though sixty-three percent said they would donate). 
95 See Panjabi, supra note 1, at 13. 
96 See Derco, supra note 79, at 162; Denise Spellman, Encouragement Is Not Enough: The 
Benefits of Instituting a Mandated Choice Organ Procurement System, 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 353, 
371 (2006). 
97 See Derco, supra note 79, at 162. 
98 See id.; Statz, supra note 87, at 1690. 
99 See Spellman, supra note 96, at 366, 371. 
100 See Statz, supra note 87, at 1690; Richard H. Thaler, Opting In Vs. Opting Out, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 29, 2009, at BU6. 
101 See Statz, supra note 87, at 1690. 
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death, their organs will not be retrieved.104 Presumed consent has had 
varied effects, but countries that utilize it experience drastically higher 
consent rates.105 
                                                                                                                     
 Both France and Spain utilize soft presumed-consent models.106 In 
France, the Caillavet Law and the Bioethics Law permit cadaveric organ 
removal for therapeutic and scientific purposes when a donor has not 
registered refusal.107 Hospitals quickly and accurately determine a pa-
tient’s status on a centralized computer refusal system.108 Initially, the 
law prohibited doctors from retrieving organs if they learned of an ob-
jection, regardless of documentation.109 This enabled families to evade 
the system and prevent organ donation by inventing objections.110 In 
response, the Council of State, France’s highest judicial body, issued a 
1983 decision banning family members from interfering in cases where 
decedents had not formally opted out of the system.111 Though the law 
does not place an affirmative duty on physicians to obtain consent, they 
continue to consult with families before proceeding with donation in 
uncertain situations.112 
 Spain’s successful organ transplant system has been praised in 
Europe.113 Similar to France’s original model, Spain’s soft presumed-
consent system allows family members to refuse donation.114 Yet despite 
this provision, Spain has extremely high donation rates compared to 
other countries.115 Commentators have credited this improvement to 
Spain’s establishment of the Organización Nacional de Transplantes 
(ONT), a network of transplant coordinators that facilitate organ dona-
tion.116 ONT operates by identifying potential organ donors and speak-
ing with their families, reinforcing the notion that more effective loca-
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tion of donors and dialogue with their families can reduce the organ 
shortage.117 
 Because Spain does not enforce presumed consent in cases where 
families object, ONT’s interaction with families is critical to procure-
ment.118 ONT utilizes psychology and communications specialists to 
create transplant coordinator strategies to effectively connect with po-
tential donors’ families.119 Of 200 surveyed families that initially re-
fused to donate a relative’s organ, seventy-eight percent were willing to 
donate after coordinators fully described the process.120 
                                                                                                                     
 Critics of presumed consent argue that despite achieving higher 
donor registrations, the model weakens the legal strength of registra-
tion itself.121 Because donor status in a presumed-consent model does 
not reflect an affirmative decision, doctors defer to the wishes of the 
deceased’s family instead of the recorded registration.122 Mandated 
choice addresses this problem by requiring all individuals to affirma-
tively indicate their preference.123 
 For example, Illinois uses a mandated-choice model that requires 
residents to designate their donation decision before renewing their 
drivers’ licenses.124 Because the law requires an affirmative indication, 
each individual’s choice is legally binding.125 By removing uncertainty, 
mandated choice enhances individual autonomy.126 Mandated choice 
also removes the inertia preventing willing donors from registering.127 
As of 2009, Illinois had a sixty percent donor signup rate compared to 
the national rate of thirty-eight percent.128 
c. Organ Commoditization 
 Although the global consensus opposes commoditizing organs, the 
wide gap between organ supply and demand has led economists to 
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propose market-based incentives.129 While some countries permit com-
pensation for reasonable expenses associated with donation,130 Iran is 
the only country with a legal organ market.131 Prospective donors con-
tact the Iranian Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA) 
and undergo medical and psychological examinations before attaining 
its approval.132 Donors receive one year of free health insurance and a 
$1200 government subsidy, in addition to $2000–$5000 from recipi-
ents.133 Recipients without the means to pay donors often seek funding 
from charities and nonprofit organizations.134 
 Following the legalization of financial incentives for organ dona-
tion in 1988, Iran’s kidney waitlist disappeared in just over a decade.135 
DATPA’s medical screenings encouraged patients to pursue safer legal 
channels rather than risk buying unregulated organs in the under-
ground market.136 Additionally, DATPA’s close monitoring displaced 
organ brokers and removed opportunities for financial exploitation.137 
The advent of a legal organ market destroyed the previously thriving 
underground Iranian market.138 Only Iranian citizens may participate 
as donors and recipients, eliminating any legal opportunity for trans-
plant tourism.139 
 Despite its success, the controversial Iranian approach has yielded 
negative outcomes for donors.140 One study found that “ninety-two per-
cent of donors said their ‘surgery and recovery’ was ‘more painful than 
expected’ . . . [and] eighty-five percent of donors regret their decisions 
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and, in hindsight, would not have donated.”141 Despite eradicating de-
ceitful brokers and hazardous medical conditions, Iran’s legal market 
preserves the underground market’s systemic inequality.142 Seventy 
percent of donors fall below the poverty line, highlighting financial in-
centives’ coercive effect.143 While Iran reduces the risk of coercion by 
prohibiting donor solicitation, the decision to sell is often driven by 
dire economic need—the same pressure that forces people into the 
underground market.144 
d. Alternative Incentives: Donor Priority and Tax Breaks 
 Singapore and Israel have crafted nonmonetary incentives for ca-
daveric organ donation by giving waitlist priority to registered donors.145 
While the systems in each country differ, they support the rationale that 
it is unfair for non-donor patients to receive the benefit of a transplant 
over a willing donor who is also in need.146 These plans remove society’s 
resentment of freeloaders and combine self-interest with public health 
goals.147 Singapore’s presumed-consent model assigns lower transplant 
priority to individuals who opt out of the donor registry. 148 Israel’s 
newly implemented opt-in system conversely gives higher priority to 
those who have been registered as organ donors for at least three 
years.149 While critics condemn the use of non-medical-factor-based or-
gan allocation, studies suggest that donor priority positively impacts reg-
istration rates.150 
 LifeSharers, a nonprofit U.S. organization, has adopted a similar 
approach.151 All members agree to cadaveric organ donation directed 
at other members of the network.152 Like the Israeli and Singaporean 
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systems, LifeSharers incentivizes donation and addresses perceived un-
fairness in organ allocation:153 roughly seventy percent of transplanted 
organs in the United States go to non-donor recipients.154 Since the 
organization started in 2002, it has gained almost 15,000 members but 
has not yet facilitated a transplant.155 
 The U.S. government has also explored methods for incentivizing 
organ donation.156 Under the Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act 
(OTPA), states have wide discretion to set incentives provided they do 
not issue direct payments.157 In 2004, Wisconsin enacted a state income 
tax deduction of up to $10,000 to cover expenses associated with organ 
donation, such as travel, lodging, and lost wages.158 Because the deduc-
tion only eliminates financial hurdles that deter donation, it does not 
qualify as direct payment.159 Supporters argue that tax deductions 
benefit individuals in higher tax brackets, thereby foreclosing pressure 
on the poor to donate.160 OTPA also allows reimbursement for funeral 
costs of cadaveric donors.161 In a separate model, Pennsylvania estab-
lished the Organ Donation Awareness Trust Fund to provide modest 
reimbursements for burial costs.162 
2. Eradicating the Effects of the Organ Shortage 
 Rather than addressing the roots of the shortage, some countries 
have implemented a variety of laws to address organ trafficking itself.163 
Most have imposed bans on organ commercialization, with varying de-
grees of success.164 Germany defines trafficking as “an activity under-
taken for personal gain and oriented towards the sale of goods.”165 
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Criminalizing the initial steps of organ trafficking thus enables German 
authorities to take preventive action before transplantations occur.166 In 
contrast, the United States forbids organ sales that affect interstate 
commerce, but does not include organ removal in its definition of hu-
man trafficking.167 As a result, organ trafficking does not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and there 
have been relatively few organ trafficking prosecutions.168 
 Most of the legislation against transplant tourism has focused on 
prohibiting organ sales within a country’s jurisdiction.169 Nevertheless, 
lawmakers in Canada proposed extraterritorial restrictions that would 
criminalize transplant tourism.170 The proposed bill would have barred 
the purchase of organs abroad, emulating existing laws that punish citi-
zens for participating in child sex tourism.171 Despite wide support, the 
bill did not pass the House of Commons.172 
 Countries that are organ trafficking hubs have more recently im-
plemented bans in an attempt to eradicate underground markets.173 
Pakistan, Egypt, Colombia, and the Philippines have all banned organ 
commercialization with little success.174 In Colombia, strict confidenti-
ality impedes the discovery of illicit transactions.175 Brokers circumvent 
the ban on foreign donations by obtaining short-term marriages be-
tween recipients and vendors, and transporting Colombian organs for 
transplantation in neighboring countries.176 
 Many countries have attempted to quell organ trafficking by re-
stricting transplant classes.177 For example, India’s 1994 transplantation 
legislation sought to discourage transplant tourism by banning live-
organ donations between unrelated individuals.178 Although intended 
to inhibit transplants between impoverished local residents and foreign 
recipients, the law permitted non-relative donations made for altruistic 
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purposes.179 Brokers thus arranged illegal organ transactions between 
strangers under the guise of altruistic donations, leading the organ 
trade to thrive.180 In 2008, the Indian Parliament passed revised legisla-
tion that imposed harsher penalties for violations and tightened over-
sight of the transplant process.181 
 China implemented similar legislation in 2007, confining live or-
gan donations to relatives.182 In addition, it banned foreign transplants 
and imposed sanctions on traffickers and hospitals engaged in trans-
plant tourism.183 Prior to the 2007 law, 600 hospitals performed organ 
transplants; today, only 163 hospitals are certified to do so.184 Further-
more, tighter surveillance and management have enabled the govern-
ment to sanction hospitals conducting illegal transplants.185 As a result, 
illicit liver transplants have decreased and the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) commended China’s altruistic model.186 
 Sanctions for engaging in OTC trafficking vary across jurisdic-
tions.187 Imprisonment ranges from two years to twenty years, with 
some countries withdrawing professional licenses and imposing 
fines.188 Most impose harsher sentences in cases involving aggravating 
circumstances such as “death of or severe injuries to the victim, use of 
coercion, kidnapping, acting in an organized manner, and the age of 
the victim.”189 Some impose liability on brokers and health profession-
als, while others hold organ recipients liable as well.190 
                                                                                                                     
B. International Response 
 While the international community has addressed both forms of 
organ trafficking, only human trafficking for organ removal has been 
included in a binding instrument.191 Although OTC trafficking has 
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been widely condemned by international organizations, such disap-
provals lack binding force.192 
1. Condemning OTC Trafficking: Non-Binding Instruments 
 International organizations have vocally opposed OTC trafficking 
through a series of non-binding declarations and resolutions.193 The 
WHO has repeatedly condemned the commodification of body parts.194 
In 1989, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO’s highest deci-
sion-making body, issued a resolution calling on member states to esca-
late legislative efforts criminalizing the purchase and sale of human or-
gans.195 The WHA subsequently released a set of Guiding Principles 
prohibiting commercial transactions involving human organs and ex-
pressing preference for cadaveric donation.196 Despite their non-
binding nature, the Guiding Principles have significantly influenced na-
tional legislation and professional codes.197 In 2004, the WHA adopted a 
resolution urging member states to cooperate in eradicating OTC traf-
ficking by coordinating their practices.198 
 International organizations with broader scopes have also ad-
dressed the issue: the UN General Assembly adopted a December 2004 
resolution categorizing OTC trafficking as transnational organized 
crime, urging member states to adopt measures to prevent and punish 
it.199 The resolution also required the Secretary-General to assess the 
extent of organ trafficking and summarize Member State responses.200 
In turn, the Secretary-General’s 2006 report stressed the continued 
growth of organ trafficking while expressing uncertainty about the 
problem’s scope.201 The report contained recommendations encourag-
ing member states to formulate policies criminalizing OTC trafficking 
and to collaborate with international law enforcement agencies.202 
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 International efforts have not been limited to intergovernmental 
bodies: in 2008, two international medical organizations held a confer-
ence in Istanbul to address unethical transplant methods.203 The result-
ing Declaration of Istanbul called for the creation of legal and profes-
sional transplantation guidelines, coupled with increased oversight.204 It 
also recommended that countries outlaw OTC trafficking and reduce 
the burden on live donors by maximizing cadaveric organ donation.205 
Although the Istanbul Declaration is non-binding, it signaled interna-
tional consensus about the problem of OTC trafficking and represented 
significant collaboration in the international medical community.206 
2. Human Trafficking for Organ Removal: Binding Instruments 
 Unlike efforts to address OTC trafficking, international organiza-
tions have made more serious efforts to combat human trafficking for 
organ removal.207 The UN and the Council of Europe have utilized 
broader human trafficking protocols to address human trafficking for 
organ removal.208 The 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
prohibits the “sale of children.”209 Its 2002 Optional Protocol adds or-
gan removal to the definition of “sale of children,” thus creating the 
first binding international legal instrument to explicitly prohibit hu-
man trafficking for organ removal.210 
 The year 2003 saw the most important milestone in international 
legal measures against human trafficking for organ removal, with the 
entry into force of the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol.211 The Pro-
tocol includes organ removal in its definition of human trafficking, sig-
naling a global consensus that human trafficking includes exploitation 
for organ removal in addition to sexual and labor-related purposes.212 
The Protocol also established that a victim’s consent does not diminish 
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a trafficker’s liability.213 It further requires parties to combat human 
trafficking through: “(1) criminalization and prosecution of acts of traf-
ficking, (2) development of trafficking prevention programs, and (3) 
provision of assistance to victims of trafficking.”214 
 Although a large number of countries have signed the Protocol215 
and adopted legislation criminalizing human trafficking, trafficker 
conviction rates have remained relatively low.216 Even after criminaliz-
ing human trafficking, sixty-two member states have not successfully 
prosecuted any violators.217 Experts estimate over two million people 
are trafficked each year, but in 2010, member states only achieved 4239 
successful convictions.218 Most countries have prioritized criminal 
prosecution over prevention and victim-assistance efforts.219 Indeed, 
authorities have tended to focus on victim assistance as an information-
gathering method to build successful prosecutions against traffickers.220 
 Regional organizations have also taken action: the 2008 Council of 
Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention established a comprehensive legal 
instrument to combat human trafficking.221 Using the definition of 
human trafficking from the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol, the 
Convention focuses on prevention and interstate cooperation.222 
 In 2009, the Council of Europe and the UN issued a joint study 
(UN/COE Study), highlighting the distinction between OTC traffick-
ing and human trafficking for organ removal.223 It emphasizes the 
need for different solutions to combat each form of trafficking, as they 
involve different types of trafficked objects: organs versus humans.224 In 
weighing possible solutions, the UN/COE Study evaluates various in-
ternational and domestic regimes, concentrating on the application of 
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binding international legal standards for human trafficking for organ 
removal.225 
 The UN/COE Study concludes that the UN Trafficking in Persons 
Protocol and the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention con-
tain “[a]ll relevant aspects for preventing and combatting” human traf-
ficking for organ removal.226 While acknowledging these instruments’ 
failure to significantly reduce organ trafficking, the study determines 
that the solution to such a failure lies in generating stronger political 
will to implement organ-removal provisions.227 The study also notes 
that publicity campaigns about human trafficking have predominantly 
focused on sexual and labor abuse without raising awareness of human 
trafficking for organ removal.228 It therefore concludes that informing 
people about the risks and methods associated with organ trafficking 
will catalyze effective prevention.229 
 In condemning the absence of binding OTC trafficking instru-
ments, the UN/COE Study recommends mirroring the framework of the 
UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol.230 First, it calls for the inclusion of a 
uniform international definition that, like the definition of human traf-
ficking, clarifies the scope of the targeted activity.231 Second, it proposes 
that the instrument include a provision similar to Article 5 of the Proto-
col, requiring countries to criminalize conduct within the defined scope 
of OTC trafficking.232 Although the UN/COE Study recognizes the need 
to reduce the organ shortage, it does not reference this in its discussion 
of binding OTC instruments.233 Instead, it recommends that countries 
share best practices and pool organ procurement resources.234 
3. Defects of Binding Trafficking Instruments 
 Because the Trafficking in Persons Protocol was the first compre-
hensive binding instrument to address human trafficking, it has had an 
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“anchoring effect” on subsequent treaties.235 Yet its limited success in 
combating human trafficking has led commentators to question its effi-
cacy.236 Though some blame a lack of member state implementation 
and compliance,237 others argue that design flaws make failure inevita-
ble.238 
 First among these design flaws, Protocol’s criminal law framework 
has drawn criticism from commentators.239 While the Protocol aims to 
combat trafficking through the combination of criminalization, preven-
tion, and victim assistance, countries have primarily focused on the first 
prong.240 Some suggest that this disproportionate focus stems from in-
consistent language in the Protocol.241 For example, Article 5 uses man-
datory language, whereas the provisions for prevention and assistance 
contain weaker obligations.242 The Protocol’s containment within the 
framework of an organized crime treaty further emphasizes its criminal 
focus.243 
 While organized crime and human trafficking do overlap, the 
scope of the Protocol inaccurately suggests that organized crime is the 
sole cause of trafficking.244 Such reasoning has also confused national 
policies that attempt to simultaneously combat organized crime and 
human trafficking.245 For example, restrictive policies often fail to dif-
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ferentiate between trafficking and smuggling and lead countries to in-
correctly deport or jail victims.246 Moreover, because the Protocol relies 
on the Convention’s definitions, it only addresses organized, transna-
tional human trafficking, while ignoring intrastate trafficking.247 The 
inaccurate scope of the instrument fails to account for the specific 
complexities of human trafficking.248 
 Critics thus argue the Protocol’s criminal law framework narrowly 
focuses on “bad actors” without considering the underlying causes of 
human trafficking.249 By emphasizing post hoc prosecution, the Proto-
col fails to address the socioeconomic realities that prompt vulnerable 
persons to migrate in the first place.250 Even when countries success-
fully prosecute traffickers, the victims remain in socioeconomic condi-
tions that leave them vulnerable to continued abuse.251 
 Moreover, the Protocol does not consider the demand for com-
mercial sex, cheap goods, and labor that drives human trafficking.252 
Instead, it only addresses trafficking as an act of violence, punishing the 
manifestation of these demands without questioning the underlying 
causes.253 Ironically, bans on organ trafficking within developed nations 
have increased the local disparity between demand and supply, thereby 
increasing demand for transplant tourism.254 In essence, critics con-
tend the Protocol’s primary criminal focus has obviated other impor-
tant viewpoints that would inform a more comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of human trafficking.255 All of these flaws provide op-
portunities to more effectively address organ trafficking in a binding 
international instrument that avoids the defects of human-trafficking 
treaties.256 Yet, to date, none of the proposed solutions has been effec-
tive.257 
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III. Analysis 
 The need for a new international instrument to address organ 
trafficking presents a unique opportunity to break out of the estab-
lished trafficking framework and its shortcomings.258 The UN and 
Council of Europe’s recommendation for combating OTC trafficking is 
anchored in the framework of the Trafficking Protocol.259 Yet given the 
Trafficking Protocol’s inherent design flaws and failure to significantly 
reduce human trafficking, it should not be used as a framework for a 
new OTC-focused instrument.260 Instead, a new instrument should 
make two fundamental changes to more effectively combat organ traf-
ficking.261 
 First, the proposed instrument should require countries to address 
the central cause of organ trafficking—the organ shortage—rather than 
focusing on the criminalization of OTC trafficking’s effects.262 National 
measures to reduce organ shortages have experienced concrete im-
provements, whereas measures to combat effects have failed to produce 
results.263 By mandating more effective organ procurement plans, the 
instrument could significantly reduce illegal market demand.264 Instead 
of merely urging countries to prevent organ trafficking, the proposed 
instrument should base its requirements on successful national pro-
curement models such as presumed and mandated consent.265 
 Second, the scope of the proposed instrument should accurately 
reflect the subtleties and intricacies of organ trafficking.266 Despite 
their differences, OTC trafficking and human trafficking for organ re-
moval are both manifestations of the organ shortage.267 They should 
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therefore be addressed in a single, independent, and comprehensive 
instrument.268 Just as placing human trafficking within the scope of 
organized crime produces inaccurate assumptions, addressing human 
trafficking for organ removal under the umbrella of human trafficking 
overlooks important differences.269 Crafting a treaty focused solely on 
organ trafficking, free from the umbrella of organized crime and hu-
man trafficking, would more accurately address the problem’s com-
plexities.270 
A. Removing Causes of Organ Trafficking 
 Centering a new OTC-focused instrument on removing the causes 
of organ trafficking would be more effective than adopting a criminal 
law framework.271 First, the criminal law framework has failed in the 
context of human trafficking, and accordingly will likely fail in the con-
text of OTC trafficking.272 OTC trafficking, like human trafficking, is a 
uniquely complex and globalized issue.273 Yet just as the Trafficking 
Protocol fails to adequately address the underlying demand that drives 
human trafficking, focusing exclusively on criminalizing OTC would 
eclipse efforts to reduce the demand fueling the underground organ 
market.274 
 Furthermore, national attempts to criminalize OTC trafficking 
have largely failed.275 Criminalizing the sale of organs has only ex-
panded the illegal underground market in most countries.276 Even 
strict bans have not stopped traffickers from inventing loopholes and 
adapting their organ sale methods.277 Commentators compare organ 
trafficking to other “demand-driven” activities such as gambling, prosti-
tution, and drug use, arguing that the most harmful aspects of these 
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crimes actually stem from their illegality.278 Some have proposed re-
moving bans and instead regulating activities such as drug use and 
prostitution in order to remove violence and other harms associated 
with the black market.279 This proposition would likely fail in the con-
text of organ trafficking because donors who sell their organs experi-
ence negative outcomes that do not stem from prohibition alone.280 
                                                                                                                     
 Instead, focusing the instrument on reducing demand while main-
taining trafficking bans would more effectively address the unique con-
tours of organ trafficking.281 The broad range of national organ pro-
curement frameworks should be used to inform the instrument’s 
requirements.282 The proposed instrument should respect unique do-
mestic cultural interests by giving countries a degree of flexibility in 
crafting an effective organ procurement system.283 Instead of requiring 
a single framework, the proposed instrument should mandate that 
countries improve organ procurement using a variety of measures.284 
 Although Iran has succeeded in reducing demand and eradicating 
the underground market, its model would likely fail on a global level.285 
Using financial incentives for organ donation violates religious, moral, 
and cultural norms and risks disadvantaging the poor.286 Moreover, re-
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quiring countries to abandon the almost universal prohibition of organ 
sales would inevitably result in low ratification rates.287 Accordingly, the 
proposed instrument should require countries to use other means of 
incentivizing donation based on their unique cultural and religious 
priorities.288 For example, the instrument can allow countries to adopt 
donor-priority systems modeled after the frameworks in Singapore and 
Israel.289 It can also enable them to provide indirect monetary incen-
tives such as tax deductions and burial reimbursement.290 
 Because altruistic donation has not produced enough organs to 
meet demand, the proposed instrument should require countries to 
establish alternative frameworks based on soft presumed consent or 
mandated consent.291 Shifting the presumption in favor of donation 
has produced desirable results when paired with comprehensive public 
outreach.292 Although requiring a pure presumed-consent system may 
conflict with values such as privacy and freedom of choice, soft models 
would be more adaptable and acceptable.293 Mandated choice may be 
even more acceptable to most countries.294 Forcing individuals to af-
firmatively indicate their preference effectively removes concerns about 
freedom of choice.295 Indeed, mandated choice increases individual 
autonomy by legally adhering to the individual’s donation prefer-
ence.296 
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 The proposed instrument should also require countries to create 
networks for more effective donor identification and public education 
about organ donation.297 Spain’s success in reducing the organ short-
age is attributable to the ONT.298 Such a comprehensive donor identifi-
cation system reduces missed transplant opportunities.299 Moreover, 
providing family members with consistent and appropriate information 
about organ donation diminishes refusal rates.300 Requiring countries 
to incorporate these two cornerstones of Spain’s success would signifi-
cantly increase the efficacy of any organ procurement system.301 
 Finally, in addition to addressing the causes of organ trafficking, 
the proposed instrument should require countries to adopt uniquely 
tailored criminal measures.302 Instead of only banning the sale of or-
gans domestically, countries must also discourage citizens from partici-
pating in transplant tourism by criminalizing the purchase of organs 
abroad.303 
 Patients who travel abroad to purchase organs experience no legal 
repercussions upon their return.304 Countries should thus adopt crimi-
nal frameworks modeled after extraterritorial child sex tourism laws.305 
For example, the Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act makes it 
illegal for U.S. citizens to travel abroad to engage in sexual activity with a 
minor.306 Similarly, countries must apply extraterritoriality principles to 
individuals who travel abroad for the purpose of purchasing an or-
gan.307 
tions of the same problem.308 Instead of leaving human trafficking for 
                                                                                                                     
B. Clarifying Scope: A Unified Approach 
 The proposed instrument should target both OTC trafficking and 
human trafficking for organ removal because they are both manifesta-
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organ removal under the purview of the Trafficking Protocol, the new 
instrument should focus on all types of organ trafficking.309 
 Despite the UN/COE Study’s conclusion that existing legally bind-
ing instruments adequately address human trafficking for organ re-
moval, these instruments have not actually yielded successful results.310 
Commentators have criticized the placement of human trafficking 
within the scope of organized crime because it does not adequately re-
flect the contours of such a complex problem.311 This line of criticism 
is further validated when considered in tandem with the fact that organ 
trafficking is buried under the scope of both organized crime and hu-
man trafficking in the Trafficking Protocol.312 
 The UN/COE Study correctly notes that the Protocol establishes a 
means for criminalizing human trafficking for organ removal, but most 
countries have failed to do so because the Protocol focuses more on 
other forms of human trafficking.313 For example, the U.S. TVPA fails to 
include organ trafficking in its definition of human trafficking.314 As a 
result, the U.S. State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report does 
not even mention organ trafficking.315 Because nations that receive un-
favorable evaluations are subject to mandatory sanctions from the 
United States, countries focus on forms of trafficking that fall within the 
U.S. definition while ignoring human trafficking for organ removal.316 
A new independent instrument that includes human trafficking for or-
gan removal would clarify the scope of the issue and prompt countries 
to adequately address all aspects of organ trafficking.317 
                                                                                                                     
 The UN/COE Study’s conclusion that the two manifestations of 
organ trafficking require different solutions exposes the underlying 
bias toward a criminal law approach.318 The need to differentiate be-
tween OTC trafficking and human trafficking for organ removal only 
arises in a criminal law context because of the desire to criminalize the 
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different actions resulting from each.319 Nevertheless, even in a crimi-
nal law context, the UN/COE Study notes that the two types of organ 
trafficking often “overlap . . . in scope.”320 Thus, while the proposed 
instrument should address these differences when delineating penal 
definitions, the broader purpose of eradicating the causes of organ 
trafficking would not benefit from such bifurcation.321 The instru-
ment’s requirement that countries revise organ procurement systems to 
reduce the organ shortage, if successful, would diminish the demand 
for all types of organ trafficking.322 
C. Implementation 
 As critics of the Trafficking Protocol have noted, departing from 
established treaty frameworks often proves difficult because of the an-
choring effect established treaties have on future agreements.323 In an 
effort to avoid great legislative change, countries often approach treaty 
formulation conservatively, with preference for established methods.324 
This tendency may be compounded when addressing organ trafficking 
because of the range of domestic frameworks for transplantation.325 
Countries may be hesitant to formulate a treaty that would force them 
to adhere to a different system of organ retrieval.326 
 Yet, despite these differences, organ trafficking’s almost universal 
condemnation may bind countries together and provide sufficient in-
centive to craft a new treaty.327 Moreover, the UN/COE Study signals 
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existing interest in the international community to address organ traf-
ficking through the creation of a binding instrument.328 
 Logistically, the treaty drafting process is often more successful if 
limited to a small number of countries because it decreases the need 
for compromise.329 Yet, an organ trafficking instrument must have 
broad international support in order to manage the transnational as-
pects of the underground market.330 Organ trafficking is a uniquely 
unethical practice, however, and may therefore attract such support for 
the treaty as countries wish to derive moral benefits from joining.331 A 
treaty with few parties may accrue additional support if countries be-
lieve signing will improve their moral standing in the international 
community.332 Organ trafficking’s widespread condemnation may en-
courage countries to join in order to satisfy their citizens’ opposition to 
organ commoditization.333 
 In addition to perceived improved moral standing, the instru-
ment’s focus on decreasing the organ gap would align with a country’s 
public health interest in improving domestic organ donation levels.334 
The moral and public health benefits associated with an organ traffick-
ing instrument will incentivize countries to join.335 Therefore, the most 
effective path for creating an organ trafficking instrument may be for a 
small group of countries to adopt a leadership role and subsequently 
encourage widespread ratification.336 Until countries successfully ratify 
a binding international instrument to target the root causes of the ille-
gal organ trade, the problems associated with OTC trafficking will con-
tinue to spread across the globe.337 
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Conclusion 
 The universal organ shortage has fueled a thriving global under-
ground market. At the national level, countries have met varying de-
grees of success in their attempts to eliminate the causes and effects of 
organ trafficking within their borders. Yet, disparate enforcement prac-
tices and inconsistent laws have done little to eradicate the global trade. 
The need for a binding international instrument is thus clear. Using a 
criminal law framework for an OTC trafficking instrument, however, 
would not significantly reduce the problem of organ trafficking. The 
Trafficking Protocol’s robust criminalization requirements have only 
led to a limited number of prosecutions. Moreover, the Protocol’s focus 
on criminalization has eclipsed other important considerations, such as 
the causes of human trafficking. Applying this failed framework to an 
instrument for OTC trafficking would similarly lead to few prosecutions 
while failing to address the underground market demand. Further-
more, continuing to bifurcate the solutions to OTC trafficking and 
human trafficking for organ removal would leave the instrument with 
an inadequate scope. Targeting human trafficking for organ removal 
under the umbrella of organized crime and broader human trafficking 
has proven ineffective. 
 Instead, the international community should abandon the crimi-
nal law framework anchored in the Trafficking Protocol and refocus 
efforts on removing the causes behind organ trafficking. Although 
criminal enforcement measures are necessary, the instrument must use 
equally mandatory language in requiring countries to adopt effective 
organ procurement systems. These requirements should be based on 
national frameworks such as presumed and mandatory consent, com-
bined with public information campaigns that have been domestically 
successful. Additionally, the instrument’s scope should clearly encom-
pass both OTC trafficking and human trafficking for organ removal. 
Creating an instrument with comprehensive organ trafficking would 
both prioritize and clarify the issue, and finally provide an effective tool 
with which to target the international organ trafficking crisis. 
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